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Abstract: Recent mobile equipment (as well as the norm IEEE 802.21)
now offers the possibility for users to switch from one technology to another
(vertical handover). This allows flexibility in resource assignments and,
consequently, increases the potential throughput allocated to each user.
In this paper, we design a fully distributed algorithm based on trial
and error mechanisms that exploits the benefits of vertical handover to find
fair and efficient assignment schemes. On the one hand, mobiles gradually
update the fraction of data packets they send to each network based on
a value called repercussion utility they receive from the stations. On the
other hand, network stations compute and send repercussion utilities to each
mobile that represent the impact each mobile has on the cell throughput.
This repercussion utility function is closely related to the concept of
marginal cost in the pricing literature. Both the station and the mobile
algorithms are simple enough to be implemented in current standard equip-
ment.
Based on tools from evolutionary games, potential games, replicator dy-
namics and stochastic approximations, we analytically show the convergence
of the algorithm to solutions that are efficient and fair in terms of through-
put. Moreover, we show that after convergence, each user is connected to a
single network cell which avoids costly repeated vertical handovers.
∗ A study of allocation games has been included.
2 P. Coucheney, C. Touati, B. Gaujal
Several simple heuristics based on this algorithm are proposed to achieve
fast convergence. Indeed, for implementation purposes, the number of iter-
ations should remain in the order of a few tens. We finally provide extensive
simulation of the algorithm in several scenarios.
Key-words: Distributed Algorithms, Hybrid Wireless Networks, Evolu-
tionary Games, Potential Games, Replicator Dynamics, Vertical Handover,
Fairness, Stochastic Approximation.
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Un algorithme distribué pour une association
utilisateur-réseau efficace et équitable dans les
réseaux sans fils multi-technologiques
Résumé : Les équipements mobiles récents (tels que définis dans la norme
IEEE 802.21) permettent aux usagers de basculer d’une technologie à l’autre
(ce que l’on nomme “handover vertical”). Plus de souplesse est autorisée
dans l’allocation des ressources et, par conséquent, cela augmente potentiel-
lement les débits alloués aux usagers.
Dans cet article, nous concevons un algorithme distribué qui procède
par tâtonnement pour obtenir une association utilisateur-réseau efficace et
équitable, afin d’exploiter les bénéfices du “handover vertical”. D’une part,
les mobiles mettent à jour pas à pas la proportion de paquets de données
qu’ils envoient sur chaque réseau à partir d’une valeur transmise par la
station de base. D’autre part, les stations de base calculent et envoient cette
valeur aux mobiles. Cette valeur, appelée “repercussion utility ” représente
l’impact que chaque mobile a sur le débit global du réseau.
Cette fonction d’utilité est à rapprocher de l’idée du coût marginal dans
la littérature sur la tarification. Aussi bien l’algorithme de la station de base
que celui du mobile sont suffisamment simples pour être implémentés dans
les équipements standards actuels.
À partir de méthodes des jeux évolutionnaires, des jeux de potentiel,
de la dynamique de réplication, et des approximations stochastiques, nous
montrons de manière analytique la convergence de l’algorithme vers une
solution efficace et équitable en terme de débit. De plus, nous montrons
qu’une fois l’équilibre atteint, chaque utilisateur est connecté à un unique
réseau ce qui permet de supprimer le coût du “handover vertical”.
Plusieurs heuristiques reposant sur cet algorithme sont proposées afin
d’obtenir une convergence rapide. En effet, pour des raisons d’ordre pra-
tique, le nombre d’itérations doit demeurer de l’ordre de quelques dizaines.
Nous comparons alors la qualité des solutions fournies dans divers scénarios.
Mots-clés : Algorithmes distribués, réseaux sans-fils hétérogènes, inter-
connection de réseau, théorie des jeux évolutionnaires, jeux de potentiels,
dynamique de réplication, handover vertical, équité, approximation stochas-
tique.
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1 Introduction
The overall wireless market is expected to be served by six or more major
technologies (GSM, UMTS, HSDPA, WiFi, WiMAX, LTE). Each technol-
ogy has its own advantages and disadvantages and none of them is expected
to eliminate the rest. Moreover, radio access equipment is becoming more
and more multi-standard, offering the possibility of connecting through two
or more technologies concurrently, using the norm IEEE 802.21. Switching
between networks using different technology is referred to as vertical han-
dover. This is currently done in UMA, for instance, which gives an absolute
priority to WiFi over UMTS whenever a WiFi connection is available. In
this paper, in contrast, we address the problem of computing an efficient
association by providing a distributed algorithm that can be fair to all users
or efficient in terms of overall throughput. Here are the theoretical contri-
butions of the paper.
- First, we propose a distributed algorithm with guaranteed convergence to a
non-cooperative equilibrium. This algorithm is based on an iterative mech-
anism: at each time epoch the mobile nodes adapt the proportion of the
traffic they send on each network, based on some values (caled repercussion
utilities in the following) they receive from the network. This work is in line
with some recent work on learning of Nash equilibria (see, for instance, [1]
[2]).
- Second, based on tools from potential games, we show that, by appro-
priately setting up the repercussion utilities, the resulting equilibria can be
made efficient or fair.
- Last, we show that the obtained equilibrium is always pure: after conver-
gence, each user is associated to a single technology.
To validate our results, we propose several practical implementations
of the algorithm and assess their performance in the practical setting of a
geographical area covered by a global WiMAX network overlapping with
several local IEEE 802.11 (also called WiFi) cells. We suppose that each
user can multi-home, that is to say split her traffic between her local WiFi
network and the global WiMAX cell, in order to maximize her repercussion
utility (to be defined later).
The integration of WiFi and UMTS or WiFi and WiMAX technologies
has already received some attention in the past.
There is a family of papers looking for solutions using Markov or Semi-
Markov Decision Processes [3, 4]. Based on Markovian assumptions upon
the incoming traffic, these works provide with numerical solutions, so as
to optimize some average or discounted reward over time. Yet, because
of the complexity of the system at hand (the equations of the throughput
in actual wireless systems are not linear, and not even convex), important
simplifying assumptions need to be made, and the size of the state space
quickly becomes prohibitive to study real systems. Moreover, these methods
INRIA
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require to precisely know the characteristics of the system (e.g. in terms of
bandwidth achieved in all configurations, interference impact of one cell
over the neighboring ones, rate of arrivals), data that are hardly available
in practice.
Our approach is rather orthogonal as we seek algorithms that converge
towards an efficient allocation, using real-time measurements rather than
off-line data. Such an approach follows game theory frameworks. There
has been recent work that, based on evolutionary games [5], provide with
optimal equilibria. Evolutionary games [6, 7], or the closely-related popula-
tion games, are based on Darwinian-like dynamics. The evolutionary game
literature is now mature and includes several so-called population dynamics,
which model the evolution of the number of individuals of each population as
time goes by. In our context, a population can be seen as a set of individuals
adopting the same strategy (that is to say choosing the same network cell
in the system and adopting identical network parameters). Recent work [5]
have shown that, considering the so-called replicator dynamics, an appro-
priate choice of the fitness function (that determines how well a population
is adapted to its environment) leads to efficient equilibria. However they do
not provide with algorithms that follow the replicator dynamics (and hence
converge to the equilibria). Additionally they do not justify the use of evo-
lutionary games. Indeed, such games assume a large number of individuals,
each of them having a negligible impact on the environment and the fitness
of others. This assumption is not satisfied here, where the number of active
users in a given cell is on the order of a few tens. The arrival or departure
of a single one of them hence significantly impacts the throughput allocated
to others. As the number of players is limited, we are hence dealing with
another kind of equilibria, namely the Nash Equilibria.
The third trend of this article concerns Nash equilibria learning mech-
anisms. In the context of load balancing, a few algorithms (see, for in-
stance [1, 2]) have been shown to converge to Nash Equilibria. Interestingly
enough, it has been pointed out that this class of algorithms has similar
behavior and convergence properties as replicator dynamics in evolutionary
game theory. It is to be noted that the main weakness of these algorithms is
that they may converge to mixed strategy Nash equilibria, that is to say to
equilibria where each user randomly picks up a decision at each time epoch.
Such equilibria are unfortunately not interesting in our case, as they amount
to perpetual handover between networks.
Finally, there is a growing interest in measuring or analyzing the effi-
ciency of Nash Equilibria. The most famous concept is certainly the “price
of anarchy” [8]. Let us also mention the more recent SDF (Selfish Degra-
dation Factor) [9]. We will show in the following that the Nash Equilibria
our algorithm converges to are locally optimal with respect to these two
criteria. In addition, it has interesting fairness properties. Indeed, we show
how our algorithm can be tuned so as to converge to α-fair points (defined
RR n° 6653
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in cooperative game theory, see [10]), for arbitrary value of the parameter
α. This wide family of fairness criteria includes in particular the well-known
max-min fairness and proportional fairness and can be generalized so as to
cover the Nash Bargaining Solution point [11].
In the present paper, we hence propose to make use of the previous works
in evolutionary games on heterogeneous network, with additional fairness
considerations, while proposing methods based on works on Nash learning
algorithms that can be implemented on future mobile equipments. In addi-
tion, our work present a novel result which is that our algorithm converges
to pure (as opposed to mixed) equilibria, preventing undesired repeated
handovers between stations.
2 Framework and Model
In this section, we present the model and the objective of this work while
introducing the notations used throughout the paper.
2.1 Interconnection of Heterogeneous wireless networks
We consider a set N of mobiles, such as mobile n can connect to a set of
network cells, that can be of various technologies (WiFi, WiMAX, UMTS,
LTE...). The set of cells that users1 can connect to, depends on their geo-
graphical location, wireless equipment and operator subscription.
2.2 User throughput and cell load
By throughput, we refer to the rate of useful information available for a user,
in a given network, sometimes also called goodput in the literature.
The throughput obtained by an individual on a network depend on both
her own parameters and the ones of others. These parameters include ge-
ographical position (interference and attenuation level) as well as wireless
card settings (coding schemes, TCP version, to cite a few). In previous pa-
pers [3, 4], the authors discretize the cells of networks into zones of identical
throughput (see Fig 1). This means that users in the same zone will receive
the same throughput. Here, we can consider that each user is in its own
zone2. The set of users connected to a network is called the load of the
network.
More formally, we suppose that each user has a set of network cells she
can connect to denoted by In. An action sn for user n is the choice of a cell
i ∈ In. Then, we denote by s the vector of users actions s = (sn)n∈N , and
call it an allocation of mobiles to networks.
1In the following we use the term users and mobiles interchangeably.
2unlike in the cited papers, we are not constrained by the size of the system that is
increasing with the number of zones.
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Figure 1: An heterogeneous wireless system consisting of a single MAN
(Metropolitan Area Network, e.g. WiMAX) cell and a set of partly overlap-
ping LAN (Local Area Networks, e.g. WiFi) hot-spots (in grey). As user
B (in zone 1) is closer to the WiMAX antenna, it can use a more efficient
coding scheme than A (in zone 2) (for instance QAM 16 instead of QPSK).
Zones are represented with a dash line, as opposed to cells, with full lines.
Then, for each allocation s, the load of network i is denoted by ℓi(s) ∈
{0; 1}N , and is such that ℓin(s) = 1 if user n takes action i, 0 otherwise. The
throughput un(ℓ
i(s)) of user n taking action i is a function depending only
of the vector of load of cell i. With these notations, the throughput received
by n when she takes decision sn is un(ℓ
sn(s)).
2.3 Pure versus mixed strategies
As opposed to multi-homing between WiFi systems (see [12, 5]), multi-
homing between different technologies (e.g. WiFi and WiMAX) induces
several complications: the different technologies may have different delays,
have different packet sizes or coding systems,... and re-constructing the
messages sent by the mobiles may be hazardous. Hence, while each user
can freely switch between the networks cells she has access to, we aim at
algorithms that converge - after a transitional state - to equilibria in which
each user uses a single network (so as to avoid the cumbersome handover
procedure). These are called pure strategy equilibria (see Section 3.4).
Yet, during the convergence phase, each mobile is using mixed strate-
gies3. Then, the experienced throughput needs to be considered in terms
3The formal definition is given in Section 3.4.
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of expectations. In this case, qn is a vector of probabilities where qn,i is the
probability for mobile n chooses cell i ∈ In. The global strategy set is the
matrix q = (qn)n∈N , while the choice Sn(q) is now a random variable such
that P(Sn(q) = i) = qn,i. It follows that the expected throughput received
by user n is E[un(ℓ
Sn(q)(S(q)))], where S(q) = (Sn(q))n∈N .
2.4 Efficiency and Fairness
In our approach, we consider elastic or data traffic. Then, the Quality-of-
Service (QoS) experienced by each mobile user is its experienced through-
put. We are hence interested in seeking equilibria that are optimal (in
the sense of Pareto) in terms of throughput. Such equilibria is a strat-
egy q such that one cannot find another strategy q′ that increases the
expected throughput of a user without decreasing that of another one:
∀q′ 6= q,∃n ∈ N s.t. E[un(ℓ
Sn(q′)(S(q′)))] > E[un(ℓ




We design a fully distributed algorithm that converges to points which













In the case of pure strategies, for each mobile n such that Sn = i,
E[un(ℓ
i(S))] = un(ℓ
i(s)). So, we aim at building an algorithm that con-







When α = 0, the corresponding solution is a social optimum. When α
tends to one, the solution is a proportional fair point (or Nash Bargaining
Solution) and when α tends to infinity, it converges to a max-min fair point.
The parameter α hence allows flexibility in choosing between fully efficient
versus fair allocation, while ensuring Pareto optimality.
Finally, it is well-known that selfish behavior in the use of resources
(networks) may lead to inefficient use, in case of congestion for example. To
circumvent this, we introduce some repercussion utility functions that are
notified to users. Thus, instead of competing for throughput, we consider
an algorithm reflecting a non-cooperative game between users that compete
formaximizing their repercussion utility. We will give an explicit closed-form
of the repercussion utility function in Section 3.2. As in the throughput case,
the repercussion utility on a cell only depends on the load on that cell. We
denote by rn(ℓ
sn(s)) the repercussion utility received by user n (as for the
throughput, the repercussion utility received by that user also depends on
INRIA
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the choices of the other mobiles of the system, as reflected in the allocation
vector s). In the case of mixed strategies, the expected repercussion utility
is E[rn(ℓ
Sn(S))]. The study of such games is given in the next section.
3 Allocation Games Related to Potential Games
This section is devoted to the formal study of allocation games. After defin-
ing what is an allocation game in Section 3.1, we introduce the repercussion
utilities in Section 3.2 what leads to a new game that is characterized in Sec-
tion 3.3. Finally, we show the useful property that this game is a potential
game (Section 3.4).
3.1 Allocation Games
We consider a normal-form game (N ,I,U) consisting of a set N of players
(|N | = N), player n taking actions in a set In ⊂ S (|In| = In), where S is
the set of all actions. Let us denote by sn ∈ In the action taken by player n,
and s = (sn)n∈N ∈ I =
⊗N
n=1 In. Then, U = (Un)n∈N refers to the utility
or payoff for each player: the payoff for player n is Un(s1, . . . , sn, . . . , sN ).
By definition, an allocation game is a game such that the payoff of a
player when she takes action i only depends on the set of players who also
take action i. One can interpret such a game as a set of users who share a
common set of resources S, and an action vector corresponds to an allocation
of resources to users (hence the name of these games).
We define the load on action (or resource) i by ℓi(s) ∈ {0; 1}N as a vector
such that ℓin(s) = 1 if player n take action i, 0 otherwise. When there is no
ambiguity, we will simplify the notation and use ℓ = ℓi(s). We denote by
ℓsn(s) the load on the action taken by player n, and we denote the payoff
for player n by un(ℓ
sn(s))
def
= Un(s1, . . . , sn, . . . , sN ).
Hence, allocations games are a wider class of games than congestion
games where the payoff of each player depends on the number of players
adopting the same strategy [13]. They represent systems where different
users accessing a given resource may have a different impact.
3.2 Repercussion utilities
We build a companion game of the allocation game, denoted (N ,I,R). The
new player utilities, called repercussion utilities are built from the payoffs
of the original game, according to the following definition:
Definition 1 (allocation game with repercussion utilities). Let us consider
the repercussion utility for player n to be:
RR n° 6653











where en denotes the vector whose entries are all 0 but the n
th one, which
equals 1.
An allocation game with repercussion utilities is a game whose payoffs
are repercussion utilities.
The utilities defined in this manner have a natural interpretation: it
corresponds to the player’s payoff (un(ℓ
sn(s))) minus the total increase in







sm(s))]). This is more obvious in
the following equivalent formulation.











3.3 Characterization of Allocation Games with Repercussion
Utilities
We now give a characterization of a payoff that is a repercussion utility.
Proposition 1. An allocation game (N ,I,R) is an allocation game with
repercussion utilities if and only if ∀ℓ,∀n,m ∈ N s.t. sm = sn,
rn(ℓ)− rn(ℓ− em) = rm(ℓ)− rm(ℓ− en). (2)




































= rm(ℓ)− rm(ℓ− en).
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Conversely, consider an allocation game (N ,I,R) such that Eq. 2 is




n∈N ℓn is the number of players taking action i. Further, let (a(k)), 1 6
k 6 K be the subscripts of all players taking action i. If there are K such
players, then ℓ =
∑K
k=1 ea(k). Then, we claim that, for any permutation σ



























































































j=1 ea(j)) remains unchanged if
one swaps a(k) and a(k+1) (elementary transposition). Then, Eq. 3 results
from the fact that any permutation σ can be decomposed in a finite number
of elementary transpositions.
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Note that the sequence a is identical to sequence b with the additional











































Hence (N ,I,R) is the allocation game with repercussion utilities asso-
ciated to the (N ,I,U) allocation game.
From Prop. 1, we conclude that allocation games with repercussion util-
ities are a special subset of allocation games. The results presented in the
following are hence valid for any allocation game such that Eq. 2 is satisfied.
Example 1. Let M be the payoff matrix of a two-player game. This amounts
to saying that the first (resp. second) player chooses the line and the second








It follows from Proposition 1 that this is a game with repercussion utilities
if and only if a = A + b − C and d = D + c − B. Then, one can check
the interesting property that there necessarily exists a pure Nash equilibrium
(for instance (a,A) is a Nash equilibrium if a > c and A > B).
3.4 Allocation Games with Repercussion Utilities are Poten-
tial Games
In this section, we show that, given an allocation game, the game with reper-
cussion utilities (1) admits a potential function and (2) this potential equals
the sum of the payoffs for all players in the initial game. This appealing
property is exploited in the next section to show some strong results on the
behavior of the well-known replicator dynamics on such games.
Consider an allocation (N ,I,U) and its companion game (N ,I,R). We
first assume that players have mixed strategies. Hence a strategy for player
INRIA
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n is a vector of probability qn = (qn,i)i∈In , where qn,i is the probability for
player n to take action i (i.e. qn,i > 0 and
∑
i∈In
qn,i = 1). The strategy
domain for player n is ∆n
def
= {0 6 qn,i 6 1, s.t.
∑
i∈In
qn,i = 1}. Then, the
global domain4 is ∆ =
⊗N
n=1 ∆n and a global strategy is q
def
= (qn)n∈N . We
say that q is a pure strategy if for any n and i, qn,i equals either 0 or 1.
We denote by S the random vector whose entries Sn are all independent
and whose distribution is ∀n ∈ N ,∀i ∈ In, P(Sn = i) = qn,i. The expected









qn,ifn,i(q). We can notice that fn,i(q)
only depends on (qm,i)m6=n and it is a multi-linear function of (qm,i)m6=n.
The next theorem claims that the allocation game with repercussion
utilities is a potential game. Potential games were first introduced in [14].
The notion was afterward extended to continuous set of players [15]. In our
case, it refers to the fact that the expected payoff for each player derives













i(S))|Sn = i]. (4)
It is interesting to notice the connection between fn,i(q) which is the ex-
pected repercussion utility, and F (q) which refers to the sum of expected
payoffs in the initial game. A strategy that increases the expected repercus-
sion utility of a player, yields to a marginal increase of the potential.
Theorem 1. The allocation game with repercussion utilities is a potential
game, and its associated potential function is F , as defined in Eq. 4.












4Notice that ∆ is a polyhedron.
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0. To simplify the notations, we omit the index i. Then,
∂F
∂qn








um(ℓ)P(ℓ(S) = ℓ|Sm = i)








P(ℓ(S) = ℓ|Sm = i, Sn = i)− P(ℓ(S) = ℓ|Sm = i, Sn 6= i)
)







P(ℓ(S) = ℓ, Sm = i|Sn = i)− P(ℓ(S) = ℓ + en, Sm = i|Sn = i)
)




E[um(ℓ(S)− en)|Sn = i]− E[um(ℓ(S))|Sn = i]
)
= E[rn(ℓ(S))|Sn = i]
= fn,i(q).
Remark 2. By adding a large constant to all payoff u, the repercussion
utilities become positive. Clearly, this has no impact on the relative potential
of allocations. The Nash Equilibria of the allocation game are also conserved.
In the following, we will assume that the repercussion utilities are positive.
4 Replicator dynamics and algorithms
In this section, we show how to design a strategy update mechanism for all
players in an allocation game with repercussion utilities that converges to
pure Nash Equilibria. We will study in the next section (Section 4.4) their
efficiency properties.
4.1 Replicator Dynamics.
We now consider that the player strategies vary over time, hence q depends
on the time t: q = q(t). The trajectories of the strategies are described
below by a dynamics called replicator dynamics. We will see in section 4.2
that this dynamics can be seen as the limit of a learning mechanism.
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In particular, q̂ is a stationary point implies ∀n ∈ N , i ∈ In, q̂n,i = 0 or
fn,i(q̂) = fn(q̂).
Intuitively, this dynamics can be understood as an update mechanism
where the probability for each player to choose actions whose expected pay-
offs are above average will increase in time, while non profitable actions will
gradually be abandoned.
Let us notice that the trajectories of the replicator dynamics remain
inside the domain ∆. Also, from [15], the potential function F is a strict
Lyapunov function for the replicator dynamics, that means that the poten-
tial is strictly increasing along the trajectories outside the stationary points.
In this context, a closed set A is Lyapunov stable if, for every neigh-
borhood B, there exists a neighborhood B′ ⊂ B such that the trajectories
remain in B for any initial condition in B′. A is asymptotically stable if it
is Lyapunov stable and is an attractor (i.e. there exists a neighborhood C
such that all trajectories starting in C converge to A). The existence of a
strict Lyapunov function yields the following:
Remark 3. The accumulation points of the trajectories of the replicator
dynamics are stationary points.
Intuitively, the limit points (that are connected) of the same trajectory
must have the same value for the Lyapunov function. But the set of limit
points is invariant for the dynamics, hence the Lyapunov function is non-
increasing on this set. The remark follows.
Proposition 2. All the asymptotically stable sets of the replicator dynamics
are faces of the domain. These faces are sets of equilibrium points for the
replicator dynamics.
Proof. We show that any set which is not a face of the domain is not an
attractor. This results from a property discovered by E. Akin [16] which
states that the replicator dynamics preserves a certain form of volume.
Let A be an asymptotically stable set of the replicator dynamics. Since
the domain ∆ is polyhedral, A is included in a face FA of ∆. The support
of the face S(FA) is the set of subscripts (n, i) such that there exists q ∈ A
with qn,i 6= 0 or 1. The relative interior of the face is Int(FA) = {q ∈
F (A)s.t.∀(n, i) ∈ S(FA), 0 < qn,i < 1}.
Furthermore, it should be clear that faces are invariant under the repli-











= 0,∀n ∈ N , i ∈ I.
Up to this transformation, the divergence of the vector field is null on
FA. Using Liouville’s theorem [16], we infer that the transformed dynamics
RR n° 6653
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preserves volume in Int(FA). This implies that the set of limit points of the
trajectories in Int(FA) is Int(FA) itself. By the previous remark, Int(FA)
is made of equilibrium points. By continuity of the vector field, all the
points in face FA are equilibria. Finally, since A is asymptotically stable,
this means that A = FA.
We say that s = (sn)n∈N is a pure Nash Equilibrium if ∀n ∈ N , ∀s′n 6=
sn, Un(s1 . . . sn . . . sN ) > Un(s1 . . . s
′
n . . . sN ).
Remark 4. Let q be a pure strategy. We denote by in the choice of player
n such that qn,in = 1. Then, a pure strategy q is a Nash equilibrium is
equivalent to:
∀n ∈ N ,∀j 6= in, fin,n(q) > fj,n(q).
The following proposition comes form a classical result that says that
the pure Nash equilibria are asymptotically stable points of the replicator
dynamics.
Proposition 3. If a stable face is reduced to a single point, then this of
the replicator dynamics are pure Nash equilibria of the allocation game with
repercussion utilities.
Proof. Let q̂ be an asymptotically stable point. Then q̂ is a face of ∆ by
Proposition 2 (i.e. a 0-1 point), with, say q̂n,i = 1. Assume that q̂ is not a
Nash equilibrium. Then, there exists j 6= i such that fj,n(q̂) > fi,n(q̂). Now,
consider a point q′ = q̂ + ǫen,j − ǫen,i. Notice that fn,i(q
′) = fn,i(q̂) since q
′





′)− ((1 − ǫ)fn,j(q
′) + ǫfn,i(q
′))










For all users m 6= n, ∀u ∈ Im, q
′













Therefore starting from q′, the dynamics keeps moving in the direction
en,j − en,i (or stays still) and does not converge to q̂. This contradicts the
fact that q̂ is asymptotically stable.
Proposition 4. Allocation games with repercussion utilities admit at least
one pure Nash equilibrium.
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Proof. Allocation games with repercussion utilities admit a potential that
is a Lyapunov function of their replicator dynamics. Since the domain ∆ is
compact, the Lyapunov function reaches its maximal value inside ∆. The
argmax of the Lyapunov function form an asymptotically stable sets A of
equilibrium points. By Proposition 2, these sets are faces of the domain
(hence contain pure points). All points in A are Nash equilibrium points by
using a similar argument as in Proposition 3. This concludes the proof.
4.2 A Stochastic Approximation of the Replicator Dynam-
ics.
In this section, we present an algorithmic construction of the players’ strate-
gies that selects a pure Nash equilibrium for the game with repercussion
utilities. A similar learning mechanism is proposed in [2]. We now assume a
discrete time, in which at each epoch t, players take random decision Sn(t)
according to their strategy qn(t), and update their strategy profile according
to their current payoff. We look at the following algorithm (∀n ∈ N , i ∈ In):
qn,i(t + 1) = qn,i(t) + ǫ rn(ℓ
Sn(S)) (1Sn=i − qn,i(t)), (6)
where Sn = Sn(t), ǫ > 0 is the constant step size of the algorithm, and
1Sn=i is equal to 1 if Sn = i, and 0 otherwise. Recall that we assume that
rn(ℓ
Sn(S)) > 0. Then, if ǫ is small enough, qn,i remains in the interval [0; 1].
Strategies are initialized with value q(0) = q0. The step-size is chosen to
be constant in order to have higher convergence speed than with decreasing
step size.
One can notice that this algorithm is fully distributed, since for each
player n, the only information needed is rn(ℓ
Sn(S)). Furthermore, at every
iteration, each player only need the utility on one action (which is randomly
chosen). In applicative context, this means that a player does not have to
scan all the action before update her strategy, what would be costly.
Below, we provide some intuition on why the algorithm is characterized
by a differential equation, and how it asymptotically follows the replicator
dynamics (5). Note that we can re-write (6) as:
qn,i(t + 1) = qn,i(t) + ǫ b(qn,i(t), Sn(t)).
Then, we can split b into its expected and martingale components:
b(qn,i(t))= E[b(qn,i(t), Sn(t))]
ν(t) = b(qn,i(t), Sn(t))− b(qn,i(t)).
Again, (6) can be re-written as:
qn,i(t + 1)− qn,i(t)
ǫ
= b(qn,i(t)) + ν(t).
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As ν(t) is a random difference between the update and its expectation, then
by application of a law of large numbers, for small ǫ, this difference goes
to zero. Hence, the trajectory of qn,i(t) in discrete time converges to the








Let us compute b(qn,i) (for ease of notations, we omit the dependence
on time t):










Then, qn,i(t) follows the replicator dynamics.
Consider a typical run of algorithm (6) over a system made of 10 users
with 5 choices over 10 networks. The figure displays for one user, the prob-
abilities of choosing each of the 5 possible choices. As user has 5 possible
choices, at time epoch 0, each choice has probability 0.2. Then, as t grows,




















Figure 2: Convergence of the probability values for each of the 5 possible
choices of one user.
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4.3 Properties of the algorithm.
The algorithm is designed so as to follow the well-known replicator dynamics.
Furthermore, the stochastic aspect of the algorithm provides some stability
to the solution: whereas the deterministic solution of a replicator dynam-
ics may converge to a saddle point, this cannot happen with the stochastic
algorithm. The use of repercussion utilities provides a potential to the com-
panion game and it is known that the potential is a Lyapunov function for
the replicator dynamics, hence the potential is increasing along the trajecto-
ries. The following theorem aggregates the main results about the algorithm
applied on repercussion utilities.
Theorem 2. The algorithm (6) weakly converges to a set of pure points
that are locally optimal for the potential function, and Nash equilibria of the
allocation game with repercussion utilities.
Proof.  The algorithm is a stochastic algorithm with constant step size.
From Theorem 8.5.1 of Kushner and Yin [17], we infer that the algo-
rithm weakly converges as ǫ→ 0 to the limit points of the trajectories
of an ode, which is, in our case, the replicator dynamics (5) (it is
a particular case of the theorem in which conditions of the theorem
hold: all variables are in a compact set and the dynamics is continu-
ous). Furthermore, the set to which the sequence q(t) converges is an
asymptotically stable set of the replicator dynamics, because unsta-
ble equilibria are avoided (the noise verify condition of [18], Theorem
1). From Proposition 2, the only asymptotically stable sets of the dy-
namics are faces. Hence the algorithm converges to faces which are
asymptotically stable. We now show that the dynamics in such a face (denoted by F ) con-
verges almost surely to a pure point. Let q̂(0) ∈ F . Then, the trajec-
tory q̂(t) following the algorithm stays in F . Furthermore:
E[q̂n,i(t + 1)|q̂(t)]





= q̂n,i(t) + ǫqn,i(fn,i(q̂(t))− fn(q̂(t))).
Since at a mixed stationary point fn,i(q̂) = fn(q̂), then E[q̂n(t +
1)|q̂(t)] = q̂n(t). Hence the process (q̂n(t))t is a martingale, and is
almost surely convergent. The process converges necessarily to a fixed
point of the iteration q̂n,i(t+1) = q̂n,i(t)+ ǫ rn(ℓ
sn(s)) (1sn=i− q̂n,i(t)),
and the sole fixed points are pure points (since the step size ǫ is con-
stant).
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that it admits a closed set A of limit points that contains no pure
points, such that A ⊂ F , where F is the smallest face of the domain
∆ that contains A. Assume, for ease of notations that F = ∆ ∩ {q :
qn,i = 0}. By Proposition 2, F is a face of ∆ that is set of stationary
points.
Denote by Aδ the δ − neighborhood of A. We suppose that δ is
small enough to ensure that Aδ does not contain any pure point (this
is possible since A is a closed set). Let A the set of ω such that
∀ω ∈ A,∀δ > 0,∀T ∈ N,∃t > T s.t. q(t) ∈ Aδ. We now show that the
Lebesgue measure of A, denoted µ(A), is null. Intuitively, as the algo-
rithm goes near the face, the probability that it follows a martingale
in the face is closed to 1, and then the trajectory will not approach
the face.
Let Â be the set of ω such that the martingale (in F ) q̂(t)(ω) converges
to a pure point for every initial condition in F . The measure of Â is
1. Let s(ω) = inf{T : ∀q̂(0) ∈ F,∀t > T, q̂(t)(ω) /∈ Aδ}. s(ω) is the
maximal time such that for every initial condition in F , the martingale
is outside Aδ. Since F is compact, it follows that for all ω ∈ Â, s(ω)
is finite. Let Â(T+) ⊂ Â (resp. Â(T−)) be the set of ω such that
s(ω) > T (resp. s(ω) 6 T ). Then, µ(Â(T+))→ 0 when T →∞. Let δ = ν
k
, where ν > 0 and k ∈ N∗. If a trajectory q(t)(ω) is such that
there exists T with qn,i(T )(ω) <
ν
k
, then there exists a duration Tk such
that ∀t ∈ [T − Tk;T ], qn,i(t)(ω) < ν, where r
def
= maxn maxs rn(ℓ
sn(s)).





). Indeed, qn,i(t + 1) >
qn,i(t) − ǫrqn,i(t). Then qn,i(T ) > qn,i(T − Tk)(1 − ǫr)
Tk . It follows




(1− ǫr)−Tk = ν. Let p(ν, Tk) be the probability that q(t)(ω), at distance less than δ = ν
k
of F at time t0, does not follow the martingale q̂(t)(ω) defined by
q̂(t0)(ω) = projF (q(t0)(ω)), during time Tk (hence q(t0 + Tk)(ω) can
be inside Aδ). Then:
∀k ∈ N, µ(A) 6 µ(Â(T+k )) + p(ν, Tk)µ(Â(T
−
k )).




simplicity, suppose that T = Tk. Then, either ω ∈ Â(T
+
k ), either
ω ∈ Â(T−k ), either the complementary set in A whose measure is 0. If
ω ∈ Â(T−k ), then q(T )(ω) ∈ A
δ with probability p(ν, Tk).
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We now show that, by taking an appropriate ν = ν(k), then p(ν(k), Tk)→
0, when k →∞. This, and the fact that µ(Â(T+k ))→ 0 when k →∞
implies that µ(A) = 0. Suppose ω ∈ Â(T−): let us define dt = d(q(t), q̂(t)) the distance be-
tween the interior trajectory, and the martingale trajectory at time t.
Then, one can check that, under ω, dt+1 6 dt(1 + ǫr), with probabil-









Indeed the vector of actions s(q) is the same as s(q̂) as long as ω












qn,k(t) − q̂n,k(t)|. See Figure 3 for an illus-
tration of this. Then, the lower bound follows from the inequality
|
∑i
k=1 qn,k(t)− q̂n,k(t)| < dt.
q1 q1 + q2 + q3q1 + q2
q̂1 q̂1 + q̂2 q̂1 + q̂2 + q̂3
0 1
Figure 3: The thick line shows the measure of the set of all ω corresponding
to the same choices for player 1 (with 3 choices).
Since d0 < ν, then dTk > ν(1+ǫr)
Tk with probability less than p(ν, Tk)












. When k → ∞, dTk goes to 0, and p(ν, Tk) goes to
0. Hence, q(t)(ω) does not follow q̂(t)(ω) for t = 0 to t = Tk with
probability p(ν, Tk), and then can be inside A
δ. Finally, the fact that the pure point attained is a Nash equilibrium
follows from Proposition 3.
One can notice that the convergence of the algorithm to a pure point
relies on the fact that the step size ǫ is constant. If it were decreasing, the
algorithm would converge to an equilibrium point in a stable face, that need
not be pure.
The combination of both algorithm (6) and repercussion utilities provides
an iterative method to select a pure allocation which is stable, and locally
optimal. This can be viewed as a selection algorithm.
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4.4 Global Maximum vs Local Maximum for the Selection
Algorithm.
In the previous section, we showed that the algorithm converges to a local
maximum of the potential function. This induces that if there is only one
local maximum, the algorithm attains the global maximum. This arises
for instance if the potential function is concave. Without the uniqueness
of the local maximum, there is no guaranty of convergence to the global
maximum. Hence, assume there are multiple local maxima (that are pure
points), which is common when the payoffs are random. Each of them is
an attractor for the replicator dynamics. In this section, we investigate the
following question: does the initial point of the algorithm belongs to the
basin of attraction of the global maximum?
Since every player has no preference at the beginning of the algorithm,
we assume that initially, ∀n ∈ N , i ∈ In, qn,i(0) =
1
|In|
. In the following sub-
section we show that in the case of two players, both having two choices,
q(0) is in the basin of attraction of the global maximum. Then, in Subsec-
tions 4.4.2 and 4.4.3, we give counter examples to show that the result does
not extend to the general case of more than two players or more than two
choices.
4.4.1 Case of two players and two choices
Proposition 5. In a two players, two actions allocation game with reper-
cussion utilities, the initial point of the algorithm is in the basin of attraction
of the global maximum.
Proof. Both players 1 and 2 can either take action a or b. We denote by x the
probability for player 1 to choose a, and by y the probability for 2 to choose
a. We denote by K = (ki,j)i,j∈{0,1} the matrix such that ki,j
def
= F (i, j),









= x(1− x)(k0,1 − k0,0 + Ky)
dy
dt
= y(1− y)(k1,0 − k0,0 + Kx),
(7)
where K = k1,1+k0,0−k0,1−k1,0. Note that in a two-player two-action game,
there are at most two local maxima. Suppose that in the considered game,
there are two local maxima. They are necessarily attained either at points
(0, 0) and (1, 1) or at points (0, 1) and (1, 0). Without loss of generality,
we can assume the former case. Hence, k0,0 and k1,1 are local maxima, and
k1,1 > k0,0 + γ, where γ > 0.
5Actually, here, the derivative of the potential is equal to the projection of the expected
payoffs on the set ∆n.
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We now define set E and function V as follows:
V (x, y) = |1− x|+ |1− y|,
E = {(x, y) : x + y > 1, 0 < x, y < 1}.
(V is actually the distance of (x, y) to the point (1, 1) for the 1-norm.) We
next show that V is a Lyapunov function for the dynamics on the open set
















First, note that ∀(x, y) ∈ E, V (x, y) = 2− x− y. Hence, from Eq. 7,
L(x, y) = −x(1− x)(k0,1 − k0,0 + Ky)− y(1− y)(k1,0 − k0,0 + Kx).
Let also be D the open segment {(x, y) : x + y = 1, 0 < x, y < 1}. Trivially,
∀(x, y) ∈ D, L(x, y = 1− x) = −x(1− x)(k1,1 − k0,0) < 0. (8)
Let us finally consider the segment
S(x0) = {(x, y) : x + y > 1, x = x0, 0 6 y 6 1}.













S(x), it is sufficient to show the negativeness of L on
S(x) for all x. Let us denote by Lx(y) the restriction of L on S(x). From
Eq. 8, we have Lx(1 − x) < 0. Furthermore, Lx(y) is a quadratic function
and its discriminant is 4(k1,0 − k0,0)(k1,1 − k0,1), hence is negative. So, for
all x, Lx(y) is negative (strictly). Finally, L is negative (strictly) in E and
hence non-positive in a neighborhood of E.
Therefore, V is a Lyapunov function for the dynamics on a neighborhood
of the open set E. More precisely, V is strictly decreasing on the trajectories
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of the dynamics starting in the set E, hence they converge to the unique
minimum of V which is the point (1, 1). This applies to the initial point
(0.5, 0.5).
Figure 5 illustrates this result: consider a two player (numbered 1 and 2),
two strategy (denoted by A and B) game. Let x (resp. y) be the probability
for player 1 (resp. 2) to take action A. While two (local) maxima exist -
namely (1, 1) and (0, 0) - the surface covered by the basin of attraction of
the global optimum (which is (1, 1) in this example) is greater than those of
the other one. A by-product is that the dynamics starting in point (0.5, 0.5)




 0  0.5  1x
y
Figure 5: An example with 2 players with 2 choices each. There are
2 maxima. The point (12 ,
1
2) is inside the attracting basin of the global
maximum.
Unfortunately, this appealing result cannot be generalized to more play-
ers or more actions, as exemplified in the following subsections.
4.4.2 Extension to more than two players
Example 2. Let us consider a three player game : (N ,I,U) with N =
{1, 2, 3}, I = {A,B}, and U = (un(i, j, k))n∈{1,2,3},i,j,k∈{A,B}, where i (resp.
j), denotes the choice of player 1 (resp. 2). The matrix representation of
(u1, u2, u3) are given below:
(u1, u2, u3)(i, j, 1) =
(
(9, 6, 4) (5, 5, 5)
(5, 8, 1) (2, 4, 4)
)
,
(u1, u2, u3)(i, j, 2) =
(
(7, 2, 8) (5, 4, 7)
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Note that this game has no pure strategies Nash equilibrium and a single
mixed strategies Nash equilibrium, which is (x, y, z) = (1/3, 5/6, 0). The
corresponding value of the potential function is 87/6 = 14.5.
The repercussion utility matrices are:
(r1, r2, r3)(i, j, 1) =
(
(10, 9, 10) (6, 5, 5)
(5, 5, 6) (1, 1, 4)
)
,
(r1, r2, r3)(i, j, 2) =
(
(6, 4, 8) (5, 3, 7)
(1, 3, 4) (9, 11, 14)
)
.
This game has two pure Nash equilibria, that are (x, y, z) = (1, 1, 1) and
(x, y, z) = (0, 0, 0), corresponding to values of the potential function that are
respectively 29 and 34.





to the local maximum (x, y, z) = (1, 1, 1) instead of the global maximum
(x, y, z) = (0, 0, 0). Note that the performance of the local maximum is way












Figure 6: Example with 3 players, with 2 choices each. The figure repre-





with x (resp. y, z) the probability for player 1 (resp. 2, 3) to adopt action A.
The dynamics converges to the point (1, 1, 1) whereas the global maximum
is (0, 0, 0).
4.4.3 Extension to more than two choices
Example 3. Let us now consider the two player game (N ,I,U) with N =
{1, 2}, I = {A,B,C}, U = (un(i, j))n∈{1,2},i∈{A,B},j∈{A,B,C}. (Note that in
this example, only the second player has three possible choices).
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The payoff matrix is:
(u1, u2)(i, j) =
(
(6, 3) (−3, 11) (−3, 10)
(0, 2) (−1, 1) (0, 10)
)
.
The companion game is:
(r1, r2)(i, j) =
(
(7, 12) (−3, 11) (−3, 10)
(0, 2) (−11, 0) (0, 10)
)
.
The original game has one single pure Nash equilibria which is (B,C)
resulting in the value 10 for the potential function and no mixed strategies
equilibria exists.
The companion game has two pure Nash equilibria that are (A,A) and
(B,C), corresponding to values of the potential function of 9 and 10 respec-
tively.
Denote x the probability for player 1 to choose action A and y1 (resp.
y2) the probability for player 2 to choose action A (resp. B). Then, the
global maximum of the potential function is 10, and is attained when x =







converges to the local maximum (1, 1, 0), corresponding to Nash equilibrium
(A,A) of the companion game, which is inefficient. Interestingly in this
example, the unique Nash equilibrium of the original game corresponds to
















Figure 7: Example with 2 players. The first one has 2 choices and the
second one has 3 choices. Here we display the 3-dimensional plot of y1 vs x
and y2 vs x. The dynamics starting in (1/2, 1/3, 1/3) converges to the point
(1, 1, 0) whereas the global maximum is (0, 0, 0).
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5 Numerical study
This section is devoted to implementation issues and shows the numerical
tests that were performed so as to study several possible practical heuristics
based on the algorithm.
First, notice that in the algorithm, users only need to know the reper-
cussion utility on their current cell to compute their new strategy vector.
Also, each base station only needs to know her own load to compute the
repercussion utilities, hence allowing for a fully distributed algorithm.
During the execution of the algorithm, at each time slot (typically, frames
are sent every 40 ms for video transmission), each user executes the algo-
rithm independently, updates her probability vector, makes a choice accord-
ing to her strategy and sends a packet to the corresponding base station.
Meanwhile, each base station measures the throughputs of all mobiles con-
nected to it and computes the corresponding repercussion utilities. Then, it
sends to every user their individual repercussion utility.
Once a user reaches a pure strategy, she informs all the cells she has
access to. Each cell waits for all users connected to her to converge be-
fore asking them to monitor their repercussion utility. From then on, any
variation of the load is due to an arrival or departure in the cell. Hence,
upon detection of a change of her repercussion utility, each user reruns the
algorithm, starting with a new probability vector.
In the previous theoretical sections, convergence of the algorithm have
been shown when the step size ǫ tends to 0. Here, we present several simple
heuristics with different step size computation methods. While the conver-
gence step should be small enough to ensure convergence, larger values are
preferable to decrease the algorithm runtime. Hence, appropriate trade-offs
need to be examined.
In the first subsection, we present the different heuristics (Subsection 5.1).
We then present the scenario to be simulated (in terms of number of users
and network topology) (Subsection 5.2). To perform the tests, realistic
throughputs need to be chosen for different combinations of loads, i.e. val-
ues of u(ℓi) for each possible load ℓi. We provide such values in Subsec-
tion 5.3. We then compare the results obtained by the different heuristics,
in terms of efficiency (the quality of the solution) and convergence speed
(Subsection 5.4). We briefly comment in Subsection 5.5 on the impact of
fairness on the resulting association. Finally, in Subsection 5.6, given the
best heuristic, we provide experimental results about: the scalability of the
algorithm on the system size, the adaptation to arrival or departure of a
mobile, the comparison with other policies, and the adaptation to different
kind of traffic.
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5.1 The Different Heuristics for the Steps
Each heuristic actually consists of two parts:
A stopping test As time increases, the probabilities of choosing each action
tends either to 0 or 1. So as to speed up convergence, we consider thresholds
δm and δM such that:
∀n ∈ N ,∀i ∈ In,
{
qn,i(t + 1)← 0 if qn,i(t) < δm
qn,i(t + 1)← 1 if qn,i(t) > 1− δM .
When one of this operation is done, the strategies are normalized to remain
in the strategy set ∆, and to preserve the condition
∑
i∈In
qn,i = 1. In the
tests, we fix δm = 0.05 and δM = 0.3.
A step size computation : different schemes to compute ǫn(t) are consid-
ered.
5.1.1 Constant Step Size (CSS)
In this heuristic, the step size is predefined and constant throughout time:
∀n ∈ N ,∀t, ǫn(t) = ǫ. For low values (CSSL), typically ǫ = 0.01, the algo-
rithm converges in almost all cases to the optimal solution, but at the cost
of a high number of iterations. For high values (CSSH), typically ǫ = 1, the
convergence and the optimality are not guaranteed anymore. Intermediate
values (CSSM ), typically ǫ = 0.1, are possible compromises.
5.1.2 Constant Update Size (CUS)
At each time epoch, each user computes the maximum step size so that the
change of probabilities for all choices, is bounded by a predefined value Γ
(fixed to 0.1 in the experiments):
∀n ∈ N ,∀i ∈ In, abs (qn,i(t + 1)− qn,i(t)) 6 Γ.
By bounding the update of every user, this scheme yields smooth changes
in the strategy vectors and hence can be expected to follow the behavior of
the differential equations.
5.1.3 Decreasing Step Size (DSS)
The underlying idea of this scheme is to use a few iterations with large steps
before using some smaller step sizes. Indeed, a big step size lets actions
associated to large repercussion utilities to quickly get high probabilities of
occurrence. Since the algorithm converges to a Nash Equilibrium regardless
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of the initial conditions, using a few large steps amounts in changing the
initial conditions so as to get close to extrema points, and hence to possible
pure strategies Nash Equilibria. Then, the following iterations with smaller
step sizes correspond to a good approximation of the CSSL algorithm. These
steps confirm (or infer) the fact that the extremal point closer to the one
obtained after the first iterations is (or not) a Nash Equilibrium.
We consider two variants of the decreasing step size mechanism. The
first one is a cyclic decreasing step size (DSSSA) (in the experiments, ǫ =
3/(t mod 10)). During each cycle a Nash equilibrium candidate is tested.
This is inspired from simulated annealing approaches.
The second variant (DSSCSS) is a decreasing step size phase followed
by a constant large step size (in the experiments, ǫ = 4/t if t < 120 and
ǫ = 4 otherwise). The underlying idea is that the first phase would stabi-
lize a certain number of users. Then, a large step size should improve the
convergence speed of the others to their respective preferable choices.
5.2 System Scenario
We consider a simple scenario of an operator providing subscribers with a
service available either through a large WiMAX cell or a series of WiFi hot
spots.
For each simulation, a topology is chosen randomly, according to 3 pa-
rameters (the number of users, the number of WiFi hot spots and the number
In of possible choices for each user). More precisely, for each user: The first choice is the WiMAX cell and one of the 8 possible zones (as
defined in Section 5.3), picked at random (uniformly). All other In − 1 choices are one of the Wifi cells, picked up according
to a uniform law. As explained in Section 5.3, we consider that all
mobiles in a common Wifi cell receive the same throughput.
The strategy vector is initialized with equal probabilities: ∀n ∈ N ,∀i ∈
In, qn,i(0) = 1/In.
5.3 Throughput of TCP sessions in WLAN and WiMAX
Computing the throughput experienced by a packet in a wireless environ-
ment is extremely hard due to the complexity of the physical system (as
opposed to wired system, where the physical medium is separated from the
outside world, and hence has reliable properties, the wireless link quality
changes at every instant, due to the environment: air quality, buildings and
physical obstacles, etc). Therefore, actual closed formula available in the
literature were obtained using strong assumptions on the outside world and
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do not refer to throughput of a single packet but of means of flows. In-
deed, as the number of packets in any connection is large, the flow is usually
approximated as a fluid.
In addition, the useful throughput of a connection, also called goodput
depends on the network protocol. Roughly speaking, two main elements
have strong impact on the achieved goodput: first is the physical system,
which depends on the technology in terms both of maximum capacity and
multiplexing technology, second is the transport protocol. In this simula-
tion study, we consider the case of TCP flows for which good throughput
approximations are available in the literature. Yet, the use of UDP flows,
or a mixture of TCP and UDP flows do not impact the performance of the
algorithm. (Note that allowing users to use either TCP or UDP protocol for
their transmission amounts, in the algorithm, to considering an additional
zone in the network cell.)
Equations of throughput in WiFi cells Based on [19], we consider









n is the number of mobiles connected to network i,
LTCP = 8000 bits is the size of a TCP packet, TACK is the raw transmission
times of TCP ACK (approximately 1.091 ms), TDATA the raw transmission
times of a TCP data packet (about 1.785 ms). Then, TW and TTBO are
the mean total time lost due to collisions and back-offs respectively. These
depend on the collision probability of each packet, and hence on the load
of the network. This collision probability can be numerically obtained via
a fixed point equation given in [19]. Figure 8 displays the throughput of a
WiFi cell, as a function of the load.
WiMAX As opposed to WiFi, the WiMAX technology uses OFDMA
multiplexing. Hence, each user receives a certain number of carriers which
are converted into a certain amount of throughput depending on the chosen
modulation and coding scheme, which greatly depends on the link quality
at the receiver side. We consider a fair sharing in terms of carriers [20],
i.e. if p users are present in the WiMAX cell, each of them will receive
NbSCarriers/p sub-carriers, similarly to processor sharing. Hence, the good-
put experienced by a user in zone z (corresponding to a coding scheme) is
roughly the fraction 1/p of the throughput she would obtain if she were
alone in the cell.
For a single user within the WiMAX cell, we follow experimental values
obtained in [21] for IEEE WiMAX 802.16d for its eight zones:
INRIA







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Figure 8: Capacity of a WiFi cell as a function of its load (in bit/s). The

















15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
35
Figure 9: Average performance of the heuristics
(CUS,DSSSA,DSSCSS,CSSL, CSSM and CSSH resp.) with dif-
ferent loads (with 5% confidence intervals).
Modulation QAM64 3/4 QAM64 2/3 QAM16 3/4 QAM16 1/2
TCP goodput 9.58 8.88 6.80 4.50
Modulation QPSK 3/4 QPSK 1/2 BPSK 3/4 BPSK 1/2
TCP goodput 3.37 2.21 1.65 1.08
5.4 Comparisons between Heuristics
Figure 9 displays the performance (in terms of global throughput) obtained
by the six heuristics (CUS,DSSSA,DSSCSS,CSSL, CSSM and CSSH
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Figure 10: Average number of iterations before convergence of heuristics
(CUS,DSSSA,DSSCSS,CSSL, CSSM and CSSH resp. ) for different
loads (with 5% confidence intervals).
resp.) as a function of the total number of users N . For a given load, all
heuristics have been tested on the same topology to allow a fair comparison.
The small constant step size (CSSL with ǫ = 0.01), provides the best
performance. It is are even tested optimal for the small values of N , up to
20.
Most heuristics stay within 10 % of the optimal (except for DSSCSS
whose performance can be poor). Also note that the total capacity of the
system is less than 36 (10 * 2.6 (WiFi) + 9.58 (WiMAX)) Mbit/s. Thus
the best heuristic is always within 5 % of the optimal. Finally, it should be
noted that the medium constant step size (CSSM) with ǫ = 0.1 is always
very close to the best (CSSL) and that the constant update size (CUS)
performs better and better when the number of users grows.
As for the number of iterations, it varies widely between the different
heuristics, even on a logarithmic scale (see Figure 10). The CUS heuristic
is a clear winner here (with an average number of iterations never above
80). Meanwhile, CSSL does not always converge within the limit of 20,000
iterations set in the program.
Under high loads, CUS provides the best compromise with very fast con-
vergence and reasonable performance. Under light load, the constant step
size of medium size (CSSM ) is also an interesting choice, for its performance
is almost optimal and its number of iterations remains below 100.
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5.5 Impact on Fairness
Consider the following scenario: a set of 20 users, each having 3 available
choices among 10 cells. The WiMAX cell is numbered 0 and its 8 zones are
numbered from 0 to 7. The set of choices of the users are I =
{{0, 1}, {8}, {1}} {{0, 5}, {6}, {4}} {{0, 1}, {6}, {9}}
{{0, 2}, {2}, {6}} {{0, 3}, {8}, {9}} {{0, 6}, {4}, {9}}
{{0, 7}, {3}, {6}} {{0, 4}, {1}, {2}} {{0, 6}, {6}, {9}}
{{0, 5}, {3}, {4}} {{0, 6}, {3}, {1}} {{0, 7}, {9}, {6}}
{{0, 3}, {8}, {1}} {{0, 6}, {4}, {7}} {{0, 6}, {9}, {5}}
{{0, 0}, {6}, {5}} {{0, 5}, {4}, {1}} {{0, 6}, {6}, {4}}
{{0, 3}, {3}, {4}} {{0, 3}, {8}, {4}}.
The optimal association scheme, for α = 0 (efficient scheme) and α = 2
(fair schemes) are respectively:
Aeff = {2, 1, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 0, 2, 1, 1, 1},
Afair = {0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 2, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 0, 1}
resulting in throughputs of:
Teff = 0.824, 1.225, 0.824, 1.225, 1.225, 1.225, 0.824, 1.225, 0.824, 1.225,
0.824, 0.824, 0.824, 2.245, 2.246, 9.58, 0.824, 1.225, 0.824, 1.225.
Tfair = 2.22, 1.225, 2.22, 1.225, 1.125, 1.225, 1.225, 1.225, 1.225, 1.225,
2.245, 1.225, 1.225, 2.246, 1.225, 1.225, 1.225, 1.225, 1.125, 1.225.
The efficient scheme achieves a total throughput of 31.29 Mb/s. The
fair scheme suffers a degradation of slightly less than 10%, with a total
throughput of 28.34 Mb/s. Yet a closer look at the figures indicates that
the efficient scheme leads to high differences between users (user 1 only ob-
tains a throughput of 0.8 Mb/s while user 16 is granted 9.58 Mb/s). As
for the fair association scheme, on the other hand, all users benefit from
throughputs higher 1.1 Mb/s. As in bandwidth allocation mechanisms in
wired systems[11], the parameter α hence allows to finely tune the compro-
mise between maximum global throughput and fairness between users.
To understand these differences, let us compare the loads between the
associations:
Lwifieff = {3, 2, 3, 2, 1, 2, 1, 2, 3}, L
wifi
fair = {1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2}.
From Fig. 8, one can see that the maximum capacity for the WiFi cells is
obtained for a load of 3 users. Hence, the efficient scheme tries to obtain
as many cells with load 3 as possible. Meanwhile, the WiMAX capacity is
maximal when its users all belong to zone 0. Hence, such users are automat-
ically associated to this cell (in our case there is only one such user, which
obtains a throughput of 9.58 Mb/s).
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On the other hand, the fair scheme tries to find balanced association
schemes. Hence, the loads of the different WiFi cells are close to one another6
(here ranging between 1 and 2) and the WiMAX cell is associated to some
users belonging to efficient zones. Their number is chosen so as to obtain
similar performance as for users remaining in the WiFi cells.
Hence, while purely efficient schemes produce lightly loaded WiMAX
cells (with only the users in zone 0), the fair scheme leads to more balanced
loads (here, 4 users in the WiMAX cell and about 2 users in each WiFi cell).
5.6 Further simulations
While very small constant step sizes provided limit points with near optimal
performance, all heuristics but CUS needed several thousand steps before
convergence for scenarios with more than 10 users and/or cells. The number
of steps for CUS never topped 100 and its limit points also proved very good
(a few percent of the optimal). All simulations reported in this subsection
use the CUS heuristic.
5.6.1 Scalability
Here, we investigate the impact of the number of mobiles and the number of
cells each mobile can connect to on the speed of convergence (Figures 11,12)).
Unlike in the previous section where the criterion of convergence speed was
the number of iterations of the algorithm, here, we measure the average
number of handovers for a mobile before convergence. It can be argued
that this new measure of convergence is more relevant since handovers are
costly for mobiles. Figures 11,12 show that the mean number of handovers
is smaller than 20 when mobiles have 2 choices, and smaller than 25 when
mobiles have 3 choices, even for large numbers of mobiles.
5.6.2 Adaptation to Arrivals and Departures
The association algorithm has to be run at every arrival or departure of a
user in a cell. Here, we simulate the occurrence of such events. Typical time
scales compare nicely: while arrivals or departures of users in WiMAX or
WiFi cells occur every minute or so, the association algorithm converges in
less than a second in most cases.
In Figures 13, 14, the arrivals follow a Poisson process. Each incoming
mobile has a message of exponential random size to download. One unit
of time corresponds to the duration of an iteration of the algorithm. In
the second figure, white noise may model perturbations on the cell capacity
(fading) as well as errors on the measures of the real throughput.
6Note that they cannot be strictly equal due to the discrete nature of the problem.
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Figure 11: Mean number of handovers for a mobile when she has 2 choices,
as a function of the total number of mobiles (full lines represent the average
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Figure 12: Mean number of handovers for a mobile when she has 3 choices,
as a function of the total number of mobiles.
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Figure 13: Adaptation to arrivals and departures: the heuristic smoothly
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Figure 14: Stability with respect to measurement errors: behavior of the
algorithm when the throughput of all cells has a white Gaussian noise with
0.45 variance.
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Figure 15: Percentage of efficiency gain by using our algorithm in compar-
ison to the fixed choice of WiFi cell for each incoming mobile. The number
of mobiles is variable, but the number of WiFi cells is fixed to 15.
5.6.3 Comparison with Naive or Sub-optimal Methods
In this section, we compare our algorithm to naive allocation methods for
incoming mobiles.
Fixed Allocation to a WiFi Cell. The first naive method for a mobile
consists in always connecting to a WiFi cell if it is possible. It is inspired
by the only currently deployed technology implementing vertical handovers
called GAN (Generic Access Network), also known as Unlicensed Mobile
Access (UMA). Actually, GAN only enables to switch between WLAN and
GSM/UMTS. The capacity of WLAN networks is so much larger than the
one of GSM/UMTS networks that switching to WLAN network whenever
possible is almost always a good choice. That is why the network selection of
GAN is very basic: the handset gives absolute preference to 802.11 networks
over GSM. However, the GAN selection scheme is unlikely to be efficient in
more complex settings, especially when the load of WiFi cells becomes very
large and when WiFi cells compete against WiMAX or LTE cells whose
performance are closer to WiFi than UMTS. Figure 15 shows the relative
improvement of our algorithm compared to GAN-like approach.
Allocation to the Best Cell. As for this second naive method, an incom-
ing mobile acts selfishly: she probes all available cells and always connects
to the one that offers the best throughput at connection time and does not
change ever after. Figure (16) shows the difference of the global throughput
when we use the both methods of association. We see that our algorithm
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Figure 16: Evolution of the global throughput using the association algo-
rithm (”algo”) and greedy probing (”selfish”). At time 0, the configuration
is the same, and the arrival processes of users are identical in the two cases.
Since the throughputs for mobiles are different in the 2 schemes, the depar-
ture times are different. The mean performance in this period of time is
40.1 for (algo), and 29.9 for (selfish).
achieves a significant better throughput than the selfish method. This is yet
another illustration of the fact that selfish behaviors lead to a bad use of the
resources.
Comparison with the Throughput as Payoff. At last, we compare
our algorithm when we use the repercussion utility as payoffs for mobiles
(Section 3.2) which ensures the convergence to an locally optimal point, to
the same algorithm when the payoff is equal to the throughput: rn
def
= un
for all users. See Figures 17,18 and 19. Here the gain is much lower but
both algorithms roughly have the same convergence time.
5.6.4 Real-Time Traffic vs Elastic Traffic
The question here is to know whether real time traffic can be taken into
account in the algorithm. In fact, for elastic traffic, utility for users is inti-
mately related to the throughput they receive. For real time traffic like voice
or video transmission, users require a certain level of throughput. Hence the
idea is to build a different utility function for these users.
The first idea is to have a null utility if the throughput is under a cer-
tain threshold, and a utility equal to 1 otherwise. The algorithm works well
with this utility but is long to converge because the discontinuity causes a
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Figure 17: Percentage of efficiency gain when using repercussion utilities
instead of throughputs, when the number of mobiles varies. The ratio of
the number of WiFi cells divided by the number of mobiles is constant and
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Figure 18: Similar to Figure 17, but the number of WiFi cells varies and
the number of mobiles is constant and equal to 30.
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Figure 20: Dependency of the time of convergence when the ratio of elastic
traffic varies. The number of mobiles is 30.
bang-bang behavior of the users. This problem can be avoided by trans-
forming the utility function: under the threshold the utility is still 0, and
becomes 1− exp(−un(ℓ
sn)) above it. This provides good solutions in terms
of convergence speed as well as a good overall utility. In Figure 20, we show
the behavior of the time of convergence of this heuristic when the ratio of
real-time traffic vary. The impact of this ratio on the time of convergence is
not significant.
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Figure 21: Traffic made of 30 initial users with 90% mice. Average packet
size for elephants is 20 times the average packet size for mice. The figure
shows the total throughput when all users apply the algorithm. The average
total throughput is 39.05Mb/s.
5.6.5 A Dynamic Scenario: between Mice and Elephants
Here, we consider that the global traffic is shared by two kinds of traffic
called mice and elephants. The mouse traffic corresponds to short lived
connections (< 1 second) and the elephant traffic to long connections (up to
one minute). There are relatively few elephants and a large number of mice
(90%), but globally, the ratio of elephant traffic represents approximately
85% of the global traffic. Whereas our algorithm is well adapted to elephant
traffic, since the time of convergence is negligible with respect to the duration
of the connection, it is not the case for mice traffic. In Figures 21 and 22,
we compare two scenarios, when both mice and elephants use the algorithm
and when only elephants do so (while mice always connect to one WiFi
cell). The second method reduces the number of handovers and preserves
the overall throughput (even giving a small gain) as seen in the Figures 21
and 22.
At last, Figure 23 shows the performance gain when we apply the al-
gorithm for mice and elephants in comparison with applying it only to the
elephants. It points out the fact that both methods have a similar efficiency,
but the second ensures a low rate of handovers. It is interesting to notice
that this is independent of the ratio of mice traffic. That means that the
loss of throughput due to the algorithm (which is important when the per-
centage of mice is high), is balanced by the loss of optimality of the second
method.
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Figure 22: Same configuration and arrival process as in Figure 21. In this
figure, mice are directly allocated to the WiFi cell without applying the
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Figure 23: Percentage of gain by running the algorithm for mice and ele-
phants instead of running it only for elephants as a function of the percentage
of mice traffic ( the global traffic average remains constant).
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6 Conclusion and Future Works
In this paper, we have designed a distributed algorithm that selects an ef-
ficient (in terms of fairness or global throughput) network association in
heterogeneous wireless networks. Simulations show that this method is rel-
evant, in comparison with naive method. This opens the way to several
interesting future works, such as the implementation of such methods in
modern mobile devices in collaboration with Alcatel-Lucent.
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